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THE SERVICEMEN'S DILEMMA: DIVORCE
WITHOUT DOMICIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective May 6, 1957, the Texas divorce statutes were amended
by the addition of the following provision:
Any person serving in a military branch of the United States who
was not previously a citizen of the state of Texas and who at the time
of filing a petition for divorce has been stationed in a military installa-
tion or installations in the State of Texas for a continuous period of
twelve months and in the county where the suit is filed for a contin-
uous period of six months next preceding the filing of same, shall for
the purposes hereof be deemed to be an actual bona fide inhabitant and
resident respectively of the State of Texas and of the county where
such military installation is located.1
The traditional jurisdictional basis for divorce actions is domicil,'
defined as presence within the state with the intent to remain indefi-
nitely or, at least, no present intent to remove,' and the United
States Supreme Court has held domicil indispensable for a divorce
decree to be entitled to full faith and credit in sister states.' The
quoted statute illustrates one way in which various legislatures have
attempted to make it possible for servicemen to maintain divorce
proceedings in the states where they are stationed without being
required to allege the intent necessary to establish domicil as tra-
ditionally defined.!
Thus, a statute such as this possibly may fail to confer the juris-
diction necessary to entitle a decree rendered under its authority to
full faith and credit in other states. There may also be some question
whether a state has the power under such a statute to render a judg-
ment which is internally valid. This latter problem was raised by a
1954 case, Alton v. Alton,' which held that an attempt by the Virgin
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4631 (Supp. 1957).
'Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Brashear v. Brashear, 99 S.W. 568
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Restatement, Conflict of Laws §5 110-11, 113 (1934). The
statutes of many states use the word "residence"; "residence" has been interpreted uni-
formly as requiring domicil. Cohen v. Cohen, 64 N.E.2d 689 (1946); see 17 Am. Jur.
Divorce and Separation § 281 (1957).
3Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), dismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610
(1954); Gallagher v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 185 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950); Morland,
Divorce and Marriage § 58 (1946); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 15 (1934).
'See authorities cited note 2 supra. As to when the decree may be attacked, see note
74 infra.
'Alabama - Ala. Code tit. 7, S 96(1) (1955); Florida - Fla. Stat. ch. 46.12 (1957);
Georgia - Ga. Code § 30-107 (Supp. 1939); Kansas - Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. S 60-1502
(1949); New Mexico - N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-4 (1953); Oklahoma - Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 1272 (1957); Texas - Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4631 (Supp. 1957).
6207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Islands to grant a divorce to someone not technically domiciled there
was a denial of due process although both parties appeared and
neither contested the issue of jurisdiction. The Virgin Islands sta-
tute' was not limited to servicemen, and the required period of
presence was only six weeks as opposed to one year under the Texas
statute but, nevertheless, the principle of that decision might be
extended to the Texas statute. Servicemen's divorce statutes similar
to the Texas act have been upheld by the courts of every state where
they have been tested on federal constitutional grounds' but have
not been considered by a federal court on the issues of either full
faith and credit or internal validity.9
The wording of the Texas statute could have received one of two
constructions, either (1) that the requirement of domicil is entirely
removed or (2) that one year's residence in the state raises a pre-
sumption of domicil. In the recent case of Wood v. Wood,"0 the
Texas Supreme Court followed the former interpretation and held
that the state has an interest in the marital relations of servicemen
who have been stationed in the state over one year sufficient to form
a jurisdictional basis for a divorce decree.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine generally the juris-
dictional bases for divorce actions, the internal validity of such
decrees, and their entitlement to full faith and credit. Emphasis
will be placed upon the consideration of servicemen's divorces, in-
cluding problems peculiar to securing this type of divorce and means
of relieving those peculiar difficulties by specially designed statutes.
Recent developments will be discussed, and an analysis of the Texas
act's compliance with the requirements of full faith and credit will
be attempted.
II. PROBLEMS PECULIAR To DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
A. Generally
Certain problems present themselves in divorce actions which are
nonexistent in other cases. 1 These problems arise from the conflicting
'Virgin Islands Divorce Law § 9.
'Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 636, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414,
320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wilson v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P.2d 319 (1954); Wood v.
Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959) (see casenote on this case in this issue of the
Journal). The Georgia statute was held to violate a technical provision of the state con-
stitution. Darbie v. Darbie, 195 Ga. 769, 25 S.E.2d 685 (1943).
'See Wood v. Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807, 810 (1959).
10-Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
" Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343




interests involved. On the one hand, a state is said to have an in-
terest in controlling the marital status of its citizens in order to
preserve the sanctity of marriage and protect interests and obliga-
tions created thereunder; that is, public policy compels the treat-
ment of the marital relationship as something more than a mere
two-party contract revocable at will by the spouses." On the other
hand, there is the need for a realistic approach permitting indi-
viduals a reasonable opportunity to dissolve their marriage legally
with the outcome certain. Certainty is necessary, of course, because
of the serious and far-reaching consequences of a decree which lacks
either internal validity or recognition in other states. For example,
property rights following the death of one party may be altered
after many years of a successful second marriage,"3 or the parties
may remarry later and find themselves prosecuted for bigamy."
A typical example of the manner in which these two interests
may conflict is afforded by the situation in which a wife from New
York, where a divorce can be obtained only on the ground of adul-
tery,"s goes to Florida for three months and in a Florida court al-
leges her intent to remain in Florida permanently. Her divorce may
then be granted on the ground of "habitual indulgence by defen-
dant in violent and ungovernable temper,""6 whereupon she prompt-
ly returns to New York. Thus, New York is deprived of its control
over the marital relations of its citizens by this temporary sojourn
and its policy that divorce should be granted only for adultery is
easily circumvented. The only protection that it has against such
obvious flouting of its laws is the requirement that the plaintiff live
in Florida for ninety days and swear that she intends to remain
there. The possibility of prosecution for perjury, which generally
operates to discourage untruthfulness on the part of litigants, is
virtually nonexistent here because there is little or no evidence
which can disprove the plaintiff's declared state of mind." Proof of
"'See cases cited note 11 supra; Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1953);
17 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation §5 12-13 (1957).
"Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
1
4 Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
"N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 8 (Supp. 1957); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 301 (1951).
" Fla. Stat. chs. 65.02, 65.04(5) (1957). Other examples of divorce forums providing
relatively lenient grounds and short residence requirements are: Virgin Islands - 6 weeks -
"incompatability of temperment"; Wyoming - 60 days - "vagrancy of husband," "indignities
to other spouse rendering condition intolerable"; Nevada - 6 weeks - "extreme cruelty" or
"habitual gross drunkenness." These grounds in themselves may not be unusually lenient;
the leniency results from the apparent ease with which the courts have permitted the
grounds to be established.
" Fla. Stat. ch. 65.02 (1957) (residence period is now 6 months).
"SSee Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. I (1955) (dissent); Williams v.
North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); see note 19 infra.
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subsequent inconsistent acts would show no more than that the de-
clared intent changed, and would be of little significance. 9 Even
the moral obligation of truthfulness in so nebulous an area as "in-
tent to remain" can be side-stepped easily by rationalization. An
argument that the interest of New York is protected by the fact
that a defendant can deny the allegation of domicil is met by the
reality that in most cases divorces are not contested by the other
spouse." Moreover, the domiciliary state does not seem to have stand-
ing to enter the proceeding itself and raise the issue of domicil."'
B. In Servicemen's Divorces
In most states it is theoretically possible for a serviceman to es-
tablish domicil in his duty state,' but the proof required is often
so difficult to muster that it is impossible for him to do so." One
such obstacle is the requirement in many states that the intent be
supported by a showing that the person entered the state by choice.4
Servicemen can make no such showing." If the state in which a
soldier is stationed requires a proof of domicil and he is unable to
meet that proof, he must return to a state in which he will be able
"°Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). Generally if the complain-
tant satisfies the court that he had established the requisite domicil at the time suit was
commenced, he may change his domicil while the case is pending without depriving the
court of jurisdiction. Jackson v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 292, 205 P.2d 297 (1949); Williams
v. Williams, 146 S.W.2d 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
2°Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 672 (3d Cir. 1953). From 1887 to 1931 approximately
13% were contested. In some cases the only contest consisted of the filing of an answer.
Following Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), there was a sharp increase in the num-
ber of divorces "contested," especially in the more lenient states.
"' The state is sometimes referred to as a quasi party. Hopping v. Hopping, 233 Iowa
933, 10 N.W.2d 87 (1943). Generally, however, the state cannot become an actual party
through the intervention of the attorney general, etc. Boykin v. Martocello, 194 Ga. 867,
22 S.E.2d 790 (1942); State ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75 (1922).
"Walsh v. Walsh, 215 La. 1099, 42 So. 2d 860 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914
(1950); Allen v. Allen, 52 N.M. 174, 194 P.2d 270 (1948); Robinson v. Robinson, 235
S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Dodd v. Dodd, 15 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
"Postle v. Postle, 280 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Green v. Green, 279 S.W.2d
395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Klingler v. Klingler, 254 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
Texas requires proof of "clear and unequivocal intention" to make Texas a permanent home
evidenced by overt acts, but does not adhere to the strict view that presence of the pros-
pective domiciliary must have been by choice. Pippin v. Pippin, 193 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946); Wilson v. Wilson, 189 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Furthermore,
if the serviceman is required by the government to live on the post, even though with his
family, he is generally precluded from establishing domicil. Harris v. Harris, 205 Iowa 108,
215 N.W. 661 (1927); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P.2d 293 (1945);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 21 (1934).
24 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P.2d 293 (1945); Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws §§ 15, 21 (1934).
21 Unless the requirement of "choice" is satisfied by "choosing" to live off the military
base. Generally, however, the "choice" refers to entry into the state. Zimmerman v. Zim-
merman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P.2d 293 (1945).
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to establish domicil to bring his suit for divorce."s For a career service-
man who has no "home" state, it may be difficult to find his state of
domicil, and even after locating it he may be confronted with un-
reasonable expenditures of time and money in order to bring his suit
in that state of which he is technically a domiciliary. Moreover, when
the serviceman brings the action in his "home" state, he is some-
times required by that state to have been present within the state for
a certain period immediately prior to filing the action."7 In order to
bring a divorce proceeding in such a state, it would be necessary for
the serviceman to be discharged and return for the statutory period,
unless he happened to be stationed there. It seems clear that some pro-
vision should be made for relieving this situation, particularly since
in most cases the serviceman is involved in his plight involuntarily.
Even assuming that domicil is the proper basis for divorce actions
generally, servicemen's divorces stand on different footings, and af-
fording them treatment different from the ordinary can be justified.
For one thing, the threat to the interest of the state of true domicil
is not the same where soldiers are involved, because usually there is
not the intentional circumvention of the laws of that state such as is
found in "quickie" divorces open to anyone with sufficient money
and leisure time. A person is unlikely to join the army in order to get
a divorce, and one in the service would seldom let the thought of
divorce influence his already limited voice in choosing a duty state.
Nevertheless, under a strict view that domicil is the only status
creating an interest in the marriage sufficient to allow a state to dis-
solve it, a divorce granted to a soldier solely on the basis of his being
stationed in a state for a year would not be entitled to full faith and
credit."s The shocking result would be that in event of attack upon
the decree in another state, the perjured allegation of domicil in the
"quickie" divorce might require that it be extended full faith and
credit, while a serviceman without any intent to circumvent the law
of the so-called domiciliary state might find himself the object of
bigamy prosecution because he did not allege domicil and, in fact,
was not required to do so. 9 It seems unlikely that a state would
prosecute a remarried serviceman on the ground that his prior divorce
is invalid because he failed to allege domicil, but it is quite possible
26Lawrence v. Lawrence, 184 Misc. 515, 53 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1945); Lewis v. Lewis, 224
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
" Marshall v. Marshall, 130 Conn. 655, 36 A.2d 743 (1944); Hiles v. Hiles, 164 Va.
131, 178 S.E. 9i3 (1935).
" See authorities cited note 2 supra.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 4631 (Supp. 1957); see Williams v. North Carolina
(II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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that the children of such a dissolved marriage might successfully
urge the invalidity of the dissolution for the purpose of claiming
property left by the death of the soldier parent."
Where servicemen are involved, a need exists for reappraising the
balance between the interest of the state in preserving marriages and
the right of an individual to have his marriage dissolved legally with
the outcome certain.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As previously stated, the requirement of domicil as a basis of juris-
diction arises from the nature of the marital relationship.3' It is more
than a mere two-party contract; it is a status in which the state has
an interest arising from its right to control the welfare and morals
of its citizens. The "citizens" over which this control is exercised are
those who have sufficient permanence to consider the state their
home, and the term used to describe this relationship is "domicil."
Domicil is not terminated by long periods of absence; it ends only
upon aquisition of a new domicil." This interest of the state con-
tinues so long as domicil exists.
The nature of a divorce proceeding is generally said to be in rem
on the theory that it is an action against the status of marriage."
This was the view taken by early decisions and seems applicable
today' although there is a period in which divorce actions were held
to be in personam." The latter view arose in the case of Haddock v.
Haddock." The plaintiff husband was domiciled in Connecticut and
his wife in New York. Connecticut granted him an ex parte divorce
(i.e., one in which the defendant neither appeared nor was cited in
Connecticut) which the New York court held was no defense to an
action by the wife for nonsupport. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that when a divorce action is maintained
in a state which is not the matrimonial domicil and which is the
domicil only of the complaining spouse, the respondent must be
"See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
" See cases cited note 11 supra.
"2Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 18, 23 (1934).
as 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce § 164 (4th ed. 1891); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
296 (2d ed. 1951).
"Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
"In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), the Court said at 572: "In other
words, the final question is whether to enforce in another jurisdiction the Connecticut de-
cree would not be to enforce in one state, a personal judgment rendered in another state
against a defendant over whom the court of the state rendering the judgment had not ac-
quired jurisdiction."
" Haddock v. Haddock, supra note 35.
[Vol. 13
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served locally or appear in order for the decree to be entitled to full
faith and credit. The exact meaning of this holding is uncertain. It
could imply (1) that jurisdiction over the "res" is unimportant
when there is personal jurisdiction over the parties, (2) that both
parties must be present before the res can be present (although this
seems to violate the concept previously recognized by that same
Court that the power to divorce grows out of domicil, which in
turn arises from permanence and is not affected by mere physical
presence), or (3) that jurisdiction of the res is necessary and is gained
by domicil of only one spouse, but a divorce action nevertheless is
sufficiently in personam to require the presence of both parties. Al-
though it held the decree was not entitled to full faith and credit,
the Court indicated that it was valid in Connecticut, where the
plaintiff was domiciled, because that state had power to determine
the status of its citizens although that determination might not be
binding on an absent spouse. 7 It is clear that there was no departure
from the requirement of domicil. The significance of the decision
probably has been greatly confused by the many conflicting inter-
pretations which have been attempted. For the purposes of this
Comment, it is sufficient to assume that its significance was merely
that ex parte divorce decrees granted in the domicil of one spouse
which is not the matrimonial domicil are not entitled to full faith
and credit.
The Haddock decision was overruled in the first case of Williams
v. North Carolina.' In that case the husband left North Carolina
and went to Nevada where he remained six weeks and then brought
an ex parte divorce action in which he alleged domicil. The Nevada
court found domicil to exist and granted the divorce. The state of
North Carolina later prosecuted the husband for bigamy following
his marriage to another person and subsequent return to North
Carolina." The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding that the change in status of the husband, who was according
to Nevada Law a domiciliary of that state at the time of his divorce,
was equally binding on the wife although she neither appeared nor
was served personally. This holding implies a return to the in rem
theory, for if an ex parte decree binds a spouse who was never in the
state of the forum and did not consent to the jurisdiction, it seems
it must be on the ground that the action is against a res present
within the forum.
3
7 Id. at 605.
38317 U.S. 287 (1942).
al State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941).
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While the in rem analogy may aid in understanding both the
nature of the domiciliary state's interest and some of the theories
based on that interest which support the requirement of domicil, it is
of little value in determining which state has that interest and
whether or not a divorce decree based on it should be recognized
in other states. This is so because the res of a marriage is elusive,
intangible, and defiant of spatial limitations. For example, where
the parties live together and maintain a home it is easy to think of
the relationship as a res. However, if the spouses leave this state and
each establishes a separate domicil, it is difficult to regard the rela-
tionship as a res and even more difficult to determine its location.
It could be argued that there is no longer a res, on the theory that
it can have no existence without a community of interest and ac-
tivities, and that it perishes when this sort of marital relationship is
not actively maintained; each of the separated parties retains his
"status" as a married person, but there appears to be nothing worthy
of designation as the res of the marriage itself. If the res is regarded
as continuing to exist, it must be "located" in two states, both of
which should have jurisdiction over it. It appears more accurate
simply to say that a state has an interest in the domestic relations
of its residents and that from this interest comes the power to alter
those relations, and that because the action by which those relations
are altered is not purely in personam, the judgment must be given
full faith and credit by sister states.
IV. VALIDITY WITHIN THE FORUM
Problems involving jurisdiction to grant divorce decrees arise in
two areas: the internal validity (i.e., the power to grant) 4' and the
entitlement to full faith and credit." This section concerns the in-
ternal validity. As stated above, numerous attempts have been made
to change the traditional requirement of domicil by means of legis-
lation." These attempts fall into three categories. First, there are
those statutes dispensing with domicil and not requiring any sub-
stantial interest in the divorcing state. One example is a statute
providing that appearance by both parties confers jurisdiction. 4
"Williams v. North Carolina (1), 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
4"Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
42Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina
(I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
43 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4631 (Supp. 1958); see statutes cited note 5 supra;
Ala. Code tit. 34, § 29 (Supp. 1945); see statutes cited note 45 infra; Virgin Islands
Divorce Law § 9 (1953); N.Y. Civ. rrac. Act § 1147 (Supp. 1957).44 Ala. Code tit. 34, § 29 (Supp. 1945), declared invalid in Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
[Vol. 13
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Another example is a statute giving jurisdiction based on a relatively
short period of residence, e.g., three months.' This latter type re-
quires some interest, viz., the period of presence, but it is felt that
such an interest is not substantial, although probably there is a point
at which mere presence would become substantial. One year, for
example, might be substantial. The second type of statute includes
those making certain facts (such as six weeks' continuous residence
within the state) prima facie evidence of domicil." The third group
is composed of statutes requiring a substantial interest based upon
something other than domicil. This type is illustrated by the service-
men's divorce statutes conferring jurisdiction based on the interest
of the state in the marital relations of servicemen stationed there for
at least a year." Another illustration is a New York statute con-
ferring jurisdiction upon its courts to terminate any marriage con-
summated within that state regardless of the domicil of the parties
at the time of the divorce action." Here the interest of New York
in marriages performed under its laws is substituted for an interest
based on domicil.
Generally, statutes of the first and third types have received op-
posite treatment by courts. Those of type three have been upheld
in every state court in which their validity has been tested, and in
several cases courts expressed by dicta the belief that decrees granted
under this type of statute would be entitled to full faith and credit.'
On the other hand, statutes of type one generally have been held in-
valid (i.e., that they failed to confer the power to grant even an
internally valid divorce)."0 A notable exception is the recent Arkan-
sas Supreme Court case, Wheat v. Wheat." Statutes of the second
type have not been given a fair determination because those that
have been construed make a very short period of presence the fact
from which domicil is to be presumed, and thus leave little rational
connection between the presumption and the fact on which it is
based." As discussed later, the general rule that a rational connection
45 Ark. Stat. § 34-1208 (Supp. 1949), upheld in Wheat v. Wheat, -Ark.-, 318
S.W.2d 793 (1958). Examples of statutory departures from domicil conferring jurisdiction
based on the grounds for the divorce: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-3 (1953) (adultery or
extreme cruelty); Minn. Stat. Ann. S 518.07 (1945) (adultery).
4 Virgin Islands Divorce Law § 9 (1953), declared invalid in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953).
" See statutes cited in notes 1 and 5 supra.
4N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1147 (Supp. 1957), upheld in David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss,
205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1954).
4 Supra note 8; David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, supra note 48.
"8 See cases cited supra note 41.
"'-Ark.-, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958); see note 69 infra and accompanying text.
"Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953).
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is necessary only when the presumption is conclusive (and thus a
rule of substantive law)53 logically does not apply in the area of
divorce because most cases are uncontested and the presumption is
not likely to be rebutted. Therefore, in divorce actions even a re-
buttable presumption must have a rational connection with the
underlying fact. 4
The precise grounds on which various statutes have been held in-
valid are difficult to determine because the language used by the
courts is often vague and very general. Examination of a few cases
will illustrate the state of the law in this area. Two significant cases
have arisen under the following Virgin Islands statute which
provides:
If the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the
complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior
thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile and where the
defendant has been personally served within the district or enters a
general appearance on the action, then the court shall have jurisdiction
of the action and of the parties thereto without further reference
to domicil or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the
cause of action arose.55
Mrs. Alton, a resident of Connecticut, went to the Virgin Islands
and after six weeks' presence filed suit for divorce under the above
statute. Her husband entered a general appearance through counsel
and did not contest the divorce. The district court" on its own
motion required Mrs. Alton to furnish evidence of domicil and upon
her failure to do so dismissed the action. The Third Circuits7 upheld
the action of the district court upon the ground that the granting
of a divorce in a state in which neither spouse was domiciled would
"conflict with the due process clause." The court said:
Our conclusion is that the second part of the statute conflicts with
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. . . . An attempt by
another jurisdiction to affect the relation of a foreign domiciliary is
unconstitutional even though both parties are in court and neither one
raises the question. The question may well be asked as to what the
lack of due process is. The defendant is not complaining. Nevertheless,
if the jurisdiction for divorce continues to be based on domicile, as
we think it does, we believe it to be a lack of due process for one state
"'Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1953); 1 McCormick and Ray, Texas
Evidence § 58 (2d ed. 1956).
" See cases cited supra note 52.
" Virgin Islands Divorce Law § 9 (1953).
56 121 F. Supp. 878 (D.V.I. 1953).




to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations between those
domiciled elsewhere. The Supreme Court has in a number of cases used
the due process clause to correct states which have passed beyond
what that court has considered proper choice-of-laws rules."'
The dissent in that case said:
.. this court now says that the fifth amendment requires that the ex-
ercise of legal power to grant divorce be restricted to these cases where
one party at least is a local domiciliary. The agreed starting point . . .
is the fact that English and American judges in recent times have
refrained, in the absence of statute, from exercising their divorce power
except in cases involving local domiciliaries. But what is it that raises
this judicial rule of self-restraint to the status of an invariable Con-
stitutional principle?"
The dissent then examined the history of divorce jurisdiction and
concluded that the requirement of domicil is a judge-made rule and
that the proper test is whether or not "it is clearly arbitrary or un-
fair for a legislature to adopt an alternative for domicil as an ap-
propriate foundation for divorce power."
The case is criticized by Professor Rheinstein:"
Neither the clause of the 5th Amendment nor that of the 14th is
of any relevance unless it can be said that some person has been, or
would be, deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. But who could allege to have suffered such a deprivation by con-
sequence of a decree of divorce rendered in consonance with . . . the
divorce act of the Virgin Islands? Certainly not the plaintiff. . . . And
the defendant? By entering a general appearance and choosing not to
defend he has at least signified his acquiescence. Who, we may ask, has
been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law?"
The Alton case is significant also because of the construction given
the first part of the statute, which made six weeks' presence prima
facie evidence of domicil. The court held that the prima facie pre-
sumption, even though rebuttable, in effect did away with a re-
quirement of domicil because as a practical matter, since most di-
vorces are not contested, the presumption would seldom be rebutted.
On this point the dissent argued that the requirement of domicil
is not removed by this provision and that the presumption is valid
because there is a "substantial rational connection" between six
weeks' presence and domicil.
In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith," in which the facts were
51 Id. at 677.
1Id. at 681.
"Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1955).
65 Id. at 779.
62349 U.S. 1 (1955).
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essentially the same as in the Alton case, the United States Supreme
Court had an opportunity to pass on the power of a state to grant a
divorce decree internally valid on a jurisdictional basis other than
domicil. However, the Court found the Virgin Islands statute in-
valid on other grounds by holding that the Virgin Islands lacked
power to legislate except with regard to "subjects of local character"
and that this divorce was aimed at tourist divorces, not local ones.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black
and Reed, criticized the majority for failing to meet the question
presented and argued for the validity of such a statute on the ground
that domicil is an outmoded, judge-made rule. He stated that due
process had no relevance because "neither of the Granville-Smiths
claims to have been deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. While the state has an interest in the marital relation-
ship, certainly this interest does not come within the protection of
the due process clause.""3 He concluded his dissent by saying: "The
only vice of the Virgin Islands' statute, in an uncontested case like
this, is that it makes unnecessary a choice between bigamy and
perjury.""
The Alton and Granville-Smith cases were decided in federal
courts. In Jennings v. Jennings,6 the Alabama Supreme Court de-
clared invalid an amendment to the Alabama divorce laws, which
provided: ". . . the provisions of this section [requiring domicil]
shall not be of force and effect when the court has jurisdiction of
both parties to the cause of action."" In holding the statute invalid
the court said that ". . the legislature of a state cannot confer on
the courts of that state a power which is not within the power of
the state to confer on the legislature."' 7 Elsewhere, the opinion em-
phasized the necessity of gaining jurisdiction over the res and of
avoiding invasion of another state's sovereignty. There was con-
siderable discussion of full faith and credit and, although the court
stated that the decision did not rest on that clause, one cannot escape
the feeling that the court was influenced by its belief that such
judgments would not be recognized elsewhere. It must be remem-
bered that in effect this statute attempted to confer "consent" juris-
diction and cerainly would stand on much weaker ground than the
Virgin Islands or Arkansas statutes, which do have some reasonable
basis for jurisdiction, namely, presence of at least one party for a cer-
63 Id. at 26.
64Id. at 28.
5251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
"Ala. Code tit. 34, S 29 (Supp. 1945).
"Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
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tain period of time. The conferring of consent jurisdiction seems at
least as far removed from conferring jurisdiction on the basis of three
months' presence as the latter is from conferring jurisdiction on the
basis of technical domicil.
In 1957 Arkansas passed a statute providing: "The word 'resident'
as used in Section 34-1208 [which required three months' residence
for jurisdiction in divorce action] is defined to mean actual presence
and upon proof of such the party alleging and offering such proof
shall be considered domiciled in the state. . . ."" Thus, physical
presence for three months was substituted for domicil. In the case of
Wheat v. Wheat,"' the plaintiff rented and lived in an apartment in
West Memphis, Arkansas, just across the border from his place of
daily employment in Tennessee. After three months he filed suit for
divorce. His wife, who was a resident of California, denied the juris-
diction of the Arkansas court, but filed a cross claim asking for
separate maintenance. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the
statute although it expressed doubt as to the external recognition of
divorces granted thereunder. The opinion stated that "with respect
to the due process clause, as distinguished from the full faith and
credit clause, we are not convinced that domicil must be the sole
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the marriage relationship.""
The court distinguished the Jennings case on the ground that "...
there was no reasonable basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the
marital status by the Alabama court."71 The court conceded that if
the period of residence were made too short the state would have no
reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over the marriage.
V. RECOGNITION IN OTHER STATES
Thorough treatment of the complex problems involved in de-
termining under what circumstances a divorce decree can be attacked
in other jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this Comment. How-
ever, it is felt that some discussion pointing out the problems which
arise will enable the reader better to understand the importance of
jurisdiction and to become aware of the results which may follow
failure to confer jurisdiction. The law in this area is unsettled, and
an examination of the cases reveals that much of the confusion may
be due to the inadequacy of domicil as the sole basis of jurisdiction.
"SArk. Stat. § 34-1208.1 (1947).
"Wheat v. Wheat, -Ark.-, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).




The second Williams case"2 followed the Supreme Court's reversal
of the first decision, which had held that an ex parte decree based
on domicil of the plaintiff husband was entitled to full faith and
credit in other states. In the second case, the North Carolina court
found that in fact the husband had not been domiciled in Nevada
and that therefore the decree was rendered without jurisdiction and
thus not entitled to full faith and credit." This time the United
States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, saying that where the
defendant spouse neither appeared nor was personally served in the
forum (i.e., when the divorce is ex parte), the finding of domicil
can be attacked in another state. This decision allowing a finding
of domicil to be attacked in a court of another state created con-
siderable uncertainty as to the finality of divorce decrees in general.
This uncertainty was eased to some extent by subsequent cases. In
Sherrer v. Sherrer,' the wife left her Massachusetts home, went to
Florida for the required ninety days, and brought divorce pro-
ceedings in which she alleged domicil. Her husband appeared and
denied the existence of a Florida domicil, but the court found in
favor of the wife and granted the divorce. The "wife" then re-
married and returned to Massachusetts. The former husband later
attacked the Florida decree in a Massachusetts court. It was found
that the wife had not been domiciled in Florida at the time of the
divorce, and on this ground the Massachusetts court refused to
extend the Florida decree full faith and credit."' In reversing the
Massachusetts court, the United States Supreme Court said that the
appearance of the husband made the finding of domicil res judicata
and entitled the Florida decree to full faith and credit in Massachu-
setts. In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged that rules
of res judicata different from those applied to other "litigants" should
be applied to the parties in divorce proceedings. He considered
such a distinction necessary in order to safeguard the interest of the
state of true domicil (considering the repeated invasion of its
divorce laws) because most divorces are not contested by the de-
fendant spouse, and that interest is thus left without protection.
The Supreme Court also has indicated that personal service in the
forum without appearance would be sufficient to preclude attack
by the cited spouse and that the out-of-state decree would be en-
"'Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
"State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944).
74334 U.S. 343 (1948).
75 320 Mass. 51, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
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titled to full faith and credit."6 Thus, it seems that a spouse who is
personally cited or who appears, whether or not he contests the
allegation of domicil, is barred from attacking the divorce decree
in any state. On the other hand, if the divorce was ex parte he is
not barred from attacking it.
The foregoing cases concerned attacks by spouses who were parties
to the divorce actions. When the external validity is challenged by
a "stranger" to the divorce under circumstances in which a spouse
would be precluded from attacking, the result is less certain. This
uncertainty arises from the different degrees of "stranger" and the
variety of purposes for which the attack may be made. For example,
the stranger may be someone who aided in the conferring of juris-
diction through a fraudulent allegation of domicil, or he may be an
innocent child of the dissolved marriage. The purpose of the assault
may be the destruction of a subsequent marriage which is otherwise
valid, or the protection of property rights established under the dis-
solved marriage. In the case of Cook v. Cook," the wife was living
with her second husband when she discovered she was still married
to her first husband. At the suggestion and expense of her second
husband she went to Florida, remained ninety days, alleged domicil,
and secured a divorce. While the record did not disclose whether or
not the first husband appeared or was served, the Court assumes for
the purpose of the decision that he either appeared or was served in
the forum. The "wife" returned to her home and remarried the sec-
ond husband. This second husband later sought to have the wife's
marriage to him declared void on the ground that she was still mar-
ried to her first husband at the time of the second marriage since she
was not in fact domiciled in Florida when she was granted a divorce
in that state. The Supreme Court held that the second husband could
not attack the finding of domicil, although he had not been a party
to the divorce. "If the defendant spouse appeared in the Florida
proceeding and contested the issue of the wife's domicil . .. or
appeared and admitted her Florida domicil . . . or was personally
served in the divorce state . . . , he would be barred from attacking
the decree collaterally; and so would a stranger such as respondent,
unless Florida applies a less strict rule of res judicata to the second
husband than it does to the first.""8 The decision does not state clearly
the basis for precluding the attack, but underlying the application
7Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948).
77342 U.S. 126 (1951).78 Id. at 127.
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of res judicata to him must have been the view that he was in
"privity" with the parties and bound as they were. Since the stranger
had participated in the scheme and was attempting to use the lack of
domicil to escape the obligations of a marriage he entered with full
knowledge that the wife was not domiciled in Florida, it seems that
the Court could have applied the simpler rule of estoppel rather
than res judicata. In Johnson v. Muelburger," the husband's sec-
ond wife obtained a Florida divorce, and the husband then married
a third wife. After his death, his daughter by the first marriage
sought to have the Florida divorce from the second wife declared
void so as to void his third marriage and thus prevent the third wife
from taking a statutory share of his estate. The United States Su-
preme Court found that under Florida law a child cannot attack a
divorce decree for lack of jurisdiction if the parent cannot do so,
and therefore held that the full faith and credit clause precluded
attack by the child in New York. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented
on the ground that the child was a stranger and that the full faith
and credit clause does not prevent a stranger from attacking the
decree, according to the principles expressed in Sherrer v. Sherrer. °
This decision indicates a strong tendency not to allow a finding of
domicil to be challenged when both spouses appeared in the original
divorce proceedings. This tendency appears stronger than it appeared
in the Cook case, because in that case the stranger participated in
the scheme, while in the instant case the attack was made by a
daughter who was apparently free of any involvement in the first
divorce.
The question of whether a state can attack a decree under cir-
cumstances in which the parties would be barred has not been an-
swered by the United States Supreme Court. Several decisions
strongly imply that where the defendant spouse appears or is cited
in the forum, attack by a foreign state is precluded just as was the
attack by the daughter in Johnson v. MuelbergerY However, there
seems to be a clear distinction between challenge by a state and by a
child of one of the spouses. Although not a party to the scheme, the
child can be barred under the theory that he was in privity with the
parties, but with regard to a state even that tenuous reasoning can-
not conceivably be applied. Also, the domiciliary state probably can
rely at least to some extent on its unique interest in the marriage
79340 U.S. 181 (1951).
'o 334 U.S. 343 (1948).




and, furthermore, a state traditionally cannot be estopped."' How
much significance will be attached to these differences remains to be
seen, because the courts so far have not been explicit in indicating
the factors precluding attack.
VI. SERVICEMEN'S DIVORCE STATUTES
A. In Other States
The cases previously discussed generally involved "migratory"
divorces, i.e., those obtained by persons who voluntarily left their
states of domicil in search of easy divorces. Most of the statutes
making such actions possible attempt to transform suits for divorce
from in rem or quasi in rem to in personam actions, with the result
that jurisdiction is often conferred by presence alone. By way of
contrast, servicemen's divorce statutes are different in both legal
theory and practical effects, for they do not convert the nature of
the suit to in personam, and therefore do not have the effect of con-
ferring jurisdiction on the basis of mere physical presence, so that
their ultimate effect does not encourage easy divorces. As will be
seen, the various statutes permitting servicemen to maintain divorce
actions in the states in which they are stationed uniformly require a
substantial interest in the divorcing state, the shortest period of res-
idence required being six months3 and the longest being twelve
months."4 While the statutes, of course, make no reference to the
possibility of their being used to defeat the legitimate interests of
domiciliary states, there is implied recognition of the fact that it
would be difficult under this statute for a serviceman to manipulate
his affairs so as to circumvent the divorce laws of his home state.
One of the earliest servicemen's divorce statutes was a 1933
amendment to the divorce law of Kansas permitting any person as-
signed to a military reservation in the state for one year to bring
an action for divorce. 5 Its validity was upheld by the Kansas Su-
preme Court in 1936.8" The court interpreted the statute not as
making a year's residence prima facie evidence of domicil, but as
removing the necessity of domicil for servicemen. There was no dis-
cussion of the act's possible unconstitutionality under the due pro-
"ZSee Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); 'Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411
(1799).
"DOkla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2 (1957).
"'All servicemen's divorce statutes other than the Oklahoma statute require one year's
residence; see note 5 supra.
"5Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-1502 (1949).
"eCraig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 636, 56 P.2d 464 (1936).
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cess clause or lack of entitlement to full faith and credit due to the
absence of domicil. In 1943, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a
similar statute providing that a serviceman stationed in the state
should be deemed prima facie to be a resident for the purpose of
maintaining "any suit.""7 Again, the court did not discuss the ques-
tion of constitutionality or of full faith and credit.
In 1951, New Mexico passed a statute similar to the Texas act."8
It provides that "servicemen continuously stationed in New Mexico
for one year shall, for purposes of instituting divorce proceedings,
be deemed residents in good faith." Two of the cases (decided by the
highest court of that state) upholding the provision offer per-
suasive arguments supporting the validity within the forum of this
type of statute and divorces granted thereunder, as well as their
recognition in other states. In Crownover v. Crownover,8" the statute
was interpreted as raising a conclusive presumption of domicil,
which was held not to be an unconstitutional provision because there
is a rational connection between one year's presence (even in the
service) and domiciliary intent. In Wallace v. Wallace," decided in
1958, the court's opinion met squarely the problem of domicil. First
it recognized that the Crownover holding amounted to a repudiation
of the theory that domicil is the only possible jurisdictional basis
for divorce. It defended the rejection of domicil, pointing out the
basic purpose for that requirement (viz., public policy) and stating
that this purpose might be served equally well by the New Mexico
statute omitting the requirement of domicil. Furthermore, attention
was called to the fact that most decisions holding domicil to be a
jurisdictional necessity were rendered in cases where it had been ex-
pressly made so by state statutes.
B. In Texas
In Wood v. Wood," decided by the Texas Supreme Court Jan-
uary 28, 1959, the validity of the Texas statute was upheld. A
serviceman stationed in Wichita Falls brought an action for divorce.
Neither he nor his wife was domiciled in Texas. The wife appeared
and urged that the statute was invalid on three grounds: (1) that
domicil is an indispensable requisite to divorce jurisdiction; (2) that
she was denied equal protection of the laws because the statute did
not provide for allowing the wife of a serviceman to bring an action
87Mills v. Mills, 153 Fla. 746, 15 So. 2d 763 (1943).
"N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-4 (1953).
88 8 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
"063 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
0"-Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
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for divorce; and (3) that the statute was "special legislation." In
answering the first argument, the Court pointed out that a require-
ment of domicil as a requisite to jurisdiction would be applicable
only to the question of full faith and credit, and the United States
Supreme Court has never held that a divorce decree has no internal
validity because not entitled to full faith and credit. Thus, the state
of Texas has the right to determine by statute who is entitled to
maintain actions for divorce within the state, and this right is not
affected by the full faith and credit clause. After expressing that
the question being decided, viz., internal validity, is in no way
affected by external validity, the Court presented strong arguments
in support of the statute as creating divorces valid externally as well
as internally. The Court reviewed the wisdom of servicemen's
statutes from a public policy standpoint, distinguishing them from
undesirable migratory divorce statutes. The interest of the state in the
marital relations of servicemen stationed there was found to be sub-
stantial enough to satisfy the public policy objections which domicil
traditionally has overcome. Hence, even if statutes designed to favor
migratory divorces are contrary to public policy and therefore in-
valid even within the forum, it does not follow that domicil is the
sine qua non of jurisdiction. The Court observed: "Texas is hardly
less concerned with the domestic relations of persons required to live
in the state indefinitely under military orders, often for a period of
years . . . , than of those who have acquired a domicil here in the
orthodox sense. ""*
The Court interpreted the cases of Williams v. North Carolina"
as requiring domicil not as a requisite to full faith and credit imposed
by the Constitution, but as a requirement of the state of Nevada; if
domicil is required by the forum, then it is of course necessary for
validity within the forum as well as for full faith and credit else-
where. Unlike Nevada, Texas does not require domicil for internal
validity. It does, however, require a substantial interest which appears
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of jurisdiction in the conflict-of-
laws sense. Thus, the Court observed: "We entertain little doubt
but that a divorce judgment rendered in conformity with this
amendment will be recognized elsewhere."" The second contention
of the wife, viz., that the statute was a denial of equal protection
because by its own terms it applied only to "°servicemen," the Court
disposed of by interpreting the statute as extending to the wives
:2Id. at 811.
3325 U.S. 226 (1945); 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"
4 Wood v. Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807, 811 (1959).
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
of servicemen the same rights given to the servicemen.' The third
objection was dismissed by concluding that the statute is not spe-
cial legislation, since it is of general public concern and applicable to
all servicemen.
VII. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the writer has reached
the following conclusions: (A) that the requirement of one year's
presence in the forum is preferable to the requirement of technical
domicil as a basis for jurisdiction in servicemen's divorces; (B) that
the courts should recognize a distinction between the validity of
a divorce decree within the forum and its recognition elsewhere; and
(C) that a receptive attitude has developed toward the acceptance
of a substantial interest other than domicil as a basis for jurisdic-
tion in divorce actions.
A. Relative Merits of the One-Year's-Presence Rule
1. Under the In Rein Analogy
Under the in rem analogy of divorce actions, the purpose in re-
quiring domicil is to assure the court that the res of the marriage
is present in the state in which the divorce is sought. While the
cases contain no general definition of the res, logically it must con-
sist of the community of activities and interests which accompany
the active maintenance of a marital relationship. If the res is thus
defined, it is apparent that the res may or may not accompany
domicil." Thus, since the requirement of domicil sometimes fails
S Presumably this means that if the wife has lived in Texas with her serviceman hus-
band for one year she can bring an action for divorce although domiciled elsewhere. The
Court justified this interpretation by analogy to the general rule that the domicil of the
wife follows that of the husband when they live together. The basis for applying this an-
alogy is uncertain, but the Court seemed to reason that when domicil is the basis for
jurisdiction and the parties live together, the thing upon which jurisdiction is based, viz.,
domicil, follows the husband. In the present statute the basis has been changed from
domicil to a "year's presence while in the armed forces," but the legislature may have in-
tended not to change the "rule" that divorce jurisdiction for the wife, whatever the basis,
follows that of the husband. A slightly different line of reasoning may have led the Court
to feel that since a wife living with her husband can bring suit for divorce in the same
forum as her husband, the legislature intended to continue allowing her to do so although
domicil is no longer the basis. Under either interpretation the analogy is tenuous, and the
Court is merely filling a gap left by the legislature. The second line of reasoning is par-
ticularly unsound because it is the fact of the wife's domicil which allows her to bring a
divorce action in a particular state, not the fact that her husband can bring an action in
that state. Nevertheless, the result seems desirable because a wife is faced with the same
hardships in complying with a requirement of technical domicil as is the husband, and
certainly the interest of the state in which they are living is the same for the wife as for
the husband. In fact, the interest of the state should be in the marriage, not merely in
the parties as individuals.
96 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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to accomplish its purpose of bringing the res within the forum,
an alternative rule should not be criticized on the ground that
it is less than perfect. It should be sufficient that the alternative
basis shows promise of serving equally as well in most cases and
better in many. Therefore, the writer believes that with reference
to servicemen's divorces the alternative rule of one year's presence
adopted by the Texas servicemen's divorce act is clearly acceptable
as a basis for jurisdiction, for domicil is a "rule of thumb" based
on the probability that wherever it is, the res of the marriage also
will be. The requirement of one year's presence is based on a similar
probability, and it is more likely that the res is present in Texas
after a year's residence than that in some unexplained manner it
inadvertently has been "left behind" in the state of technical domicil.
For example, assume that a serviceman stationed in Texas lives off
the military base with his wife and children. The children attend
public schools, the family belongs to a local church, and to all ap-
pearances the members of the family have become members of the
community. In this situation it seems clear that Texas is the situs
of the res, rather than the state of technical domicil from which
the family has been absent for several years.
2. Under the "Quasi In Rem" Theory
Admittedly, when the marriage relationship is not actively main-
tained, the in rem analogy becomes tenuous since there appears to be
no marital res in existence. A suit for divorce under these cir-
cumstances more nearly becomes akin to an in personam action than
to one in rem, subject to the qualification that dissolution must be
accomplished by a state having an interest in the marital status of at
least one of the parties."8 Once again domicil is required in most juris-
dictions to assure that the forum has a substantial interest in the mar-
ital status. By the same reasoning previously applied to the in rem an-
alogy, the requirement of one year's presence should be equally ac-
ceptable since domicil may or may not locate the state with the great-
est interest in the marital status of the parties and therefore is itself
an imperfect rule. The chief criticism of domicil as a criterion in this
type of situation is that the control of the state of true interest in the
marriage easily can be defeated by means of a short visit and some
relatively painless perjury." As a matter of fact, domicil often de-
feats its own purpose; that is, a very short period of residence is often
97 Ibid.
" Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
99 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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justified by the fact that it is accompanied by the allegation of an
intent to remain indefinitely. The Texas statute, lacking this justi-
fication, requires presence for an entire year. Viewed from this stand-
point, it makes circumvention of the divorce laws of a particular
state more difficult than does a requirement of technical domicil. For
example, while it is financially feasible for many dissatisfied spouses
to spend six weeks in another state, the cost of a year's residence
would be prohibitive.
If it is held that the Texas statute satisfies the requirements of full
faith and credit, it will provide former spouses with greater certainty
as to the finality of their divorces.10 The only jurisdictional fact
which could be relitigated is the objective fact of one year's presence,
not the subjective intent of the complaining spouse.
B. Distinction Between Internal Validity and Recognition Elsewhere
One area of uncertainty not limited to servicemen's divorces is the
question of the internal validity of decrees which are not entitled to
full faith and credit. Recent decisions provide some justification for
saying that divorce judgments may be valid in the forum although not
required to be recognized in other states." 1 Implicit in such a distinc-
tion is the view that jurisdiction for purposes of internal validity may
differ slightly from the jurisdiction necessary for full faith and credit.
Opposed to this view are the Alton, 5 Granville-Smith,""3 and Jen-
nings"°4 decisions, which apparently treat jurisdiction for internal val-
idity purposes the same as for recognition elsewhere, and in effect re-
quire entitlement to full faith and credit before a decree may be
valid in the forum."5 For the writer, the preferable view is that juris-
diction necessary to entitle the decree to full faith and credit should
not be required for validity within the forum. Admittedly, jurisdic-
tion for internal validity should require some reasonable basis, and
100 See notes 13 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
101 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414,
320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Crownover v. Crownover, S8 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954);
Wheat v. Wheat, -Ark.-, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).
'Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
..3 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
'04 Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
... In the Alton case the court was not explicit in its use of "due process," but appar-
ently the term referred to substantive due process because clearly there was no lack of
procedural due process (unless the state of true domicil was being deprived of "property"
without due process). To the writer it seems that substantive due process might be equated
to jurisdiction in the conflict-of-laws sense and should be necessary to entitle a judgment
to full faith and credit, but should not be required for establishing validity within the
forum. On the other hand, procedural due process which concerns fair play, proper notice,
opportunity to be heard, etc., is fundamental in our conception of justice, and a lack of
it should, of course, deprive a judgment of validity even within the forum.
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unquestionably procedural due process must be complied with; but
when these two requirements have been met, compliance with sub-
stantive due process should be unnecessary to entitle a decree to val-
idity within the forum. The decision of the Arkansas court in the
Wheat case. 0 appears to reach a legally desirable result by deciding
internal validity without regard to the question of full faith and
credit, although the writer believes that presence within the state for
a period of only three months is not the reasonable basis necessary
to confer jurisdiction for internal validity. Presumably, however, if
the United States Supreme Court finds the decree is not entitled to
full faith and credit and the Arkansas judgment is then challenged in
Arkansas, the decree will not be valid even in that state. '
C. Acceptance of a Substantial Interest as a Substitute for Domicil
Since 1942, the year of the first Williams decision, the law of
divorce jurisdiction has been undergoing extensive change. An im-
pressive body of case law is building support for relaxing the rigid
requirement of technical domicil so as to permit servicemen to secure
divorce decrees based on presence in their duty state for a substan-
tial period of time."' The highest courts of at least three states have
upheld servicemen's statutes in decisions offering sound arguments
for the validity of the decrees externally as well as internally."9 Also,
the New York courts have upheld a statute conferring jurisdiction
to dissolve any marriage consummated in New York regardless of
where the parties are domiciled at the time of the divorce." ' On the
basis of these facts it is reasonable to infer that the United States
Supreme Court will be receptive to statutes such as the Texas service-
men's divorce act which in effect call for a relaxation of the rigid
requirements of technical domicil. This inference appears all the
more reasonable when it is recognized that the former Supreme
Court decisions stating that domicil is essential to full faith and cre-
dit may be distinguished on the ground that in each of those cases
.00 Wheat v. Wheat, -Ark.-, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).
107 The challenge could arise in this manner: The defendant spouse might seek to en-
force in Arkansas a judgment from the domiciliary state based on a finding by the state
of domicil that the Arkansas court was without jurisdiction. The out-of-state decree, if
entitled to full faith and credit, would force Arkansas to recognize it even though it
meant setting aside the original Arkansas decree.
'G Mills v. Mills, 153 Fla. 746, 15 So. 2d 763 (1943); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 636,
56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wilson
v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P.2d 319 (1954); Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597,
274 P.2d 127 (1954); Wood v. Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
"osCraig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 636, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M.
414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wood v. Wood, -Tex.-, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
ss9 David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1954).
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the divorce had been granted in a state which required domicil."'
If this distinction is drawn, it will not be necessary to overrule those
cases stating that domicil is indispensable. However, even if the ex-
tension of full faith and credit to decrees granted under servicemen's
divorce statutes does require the limited overruling of prior deci-
sions, the change would be no more radical than that effected by the
first Williams case.' when it overruled the decision in Haddock v.
Haddock.13
Roger Rhodes
.. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
.. See cases cited note 11 supra.
11 See note 35 supra.
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